7 Week 03 — [Title TBD]
[Dates TBD]
8 Unit 1: The Physical Mind
Bayne coverage: Introduction (pp. 1–5), Ch. 1 (pp. 6–22), Ch. 2 (pp. 24–36), Ch. 3 (pp. 37–54)
Standard problems: What distinguishes mental states from physical states? What would it mean for love to be fully explained by neuroscience? Behaviourism, identity theory, functionalism, and eliminativism.
8.1 Week 1 — What Is a Mind? What Is Love?
Mon Aug 24 / Wed Aug 26
Mon Aug 24:
- Bayne, Introduction: “A Map of the Mind” (pp. 1–5)
- Bayne, Ch. 1: “Marks of the Mental” (pp. 6–22)
- Brogaard, Ch. 1: “Letter from a Friend” (pp. 1–12)
Wed Aug 26: The marks of the mental applied to love. Does love exhibit intentionality, phenomenal character, or both?
- Brogaard, Ch. 2: “The Chemistry of Love” (pp. 13–40, through “Beliefs and Brain Chemistry”)
Bayne Ch. 1 (pp. 11–20) identifies intentionality and phenomenal consciousness as the two central marks of the mental. As you read Brogaard Ch. 2, ask: does the chemistry of love exhibit intentionality (is it about something), phenomenal character (is there something it is like to be in this state), or both? See Bayne’s discussion of qualia (p. 17) and the propositional attitudes box (p. 13).
Bayne (pp. 11–20) distinguishes intentionality from phenomenal consciousness. Using Brogaard Ch. 2, identify one aspect of love that seems clearly intentional and one that seems clearly phenomenal. Is there anything about love that seems to be neither?
8.2 Week 2 — Physicalism and the Chemistry of Love
Mon Aug 31 / Wed Sep 2
Mon Aug 31:
- Bayne, Ch. 2: “Physicalism” (pp. 24–36)
- Brogaard, Ch. 2: “The Chemistry of Love” (pp. 40–58, remainder)
Wed Sep 2: Prinz Lecture 1 — Somatic Emotion and Eliminativism. The instructor presents Prinz’s somatic marker theory (Gut Reactions Ch. 3–4). Précis distributed. Discussion: is Prinz a functionalist, identity theorist, or eliminativist about love? Where does he sit on Bayne’s map?
- Bayne, Ch. 3: “How to be a Physicalist” (pp. 37–54) — read before class
Bayne Ch. 2 (pp. 24–36) distinguishes type identity theory from functionalism. Bayne Ch. 3 (pp. 44–54) presents functionalism and eliminativism in detail. Brogaard’s perceived-response theory is functionalist: love is defined by its causal and representational role. Prinz’s somatic marker theory leans toward identity theory: the emotion just is the somatic state. After the Prinz lecture, place both on Bayne’s taxonomy. See especially multiple realization (p. 43) and eliminativism (pp. 47–52).
Using Bayne Ch. 2–3 (pp. 24–54), classify Brogaard’s account of love. Is she a behaviourist, identity theorist, functionalist, or eliminativist? After the Prinz lecture, classify Prinz. Which classification best survives the objections Bayne raises?
8.3 Week 3 — Physicalism and Irrational Love
Wed Sep 9 only (Labor Day — no Monday class)
Wed Sep 9: Love as a psychological kind. Can a physicalist account explain irrational love? Love as moral emotion, love as history, love and personal identity.
- Brogaard, Ch. 4: “Irrational Love” (pp. 59–116, full chapter)
Bayne Ch. 3 (pp. 47–52) discusses eliminativism — the view that folk psychological categories like “love” will eventually be replaced by neuroscientific ones. Brogaard’s Ch. 4 implicitly resists this: she treats love as a genuine psychological kind with normative properties (it can be rational or irrational). See the box on eliminativism and incoherence (p. 50). Ask whether “irrational love” is a concept that survives eliminativist pressure.
Bayne (pp. 47–52) raises the possibility that folk psychological categories like “love” might be eliminated in favour of neuroscientific ones. Brogaard treats love as a genuine psychological kind that can be rational or irrational. Which view is more defensible, and why?
8.4 Week 4 — 1st DND Adventure: Physicalism on Trial (Student-Led)
Mon Sep 14 / Wed Sep 16
Mon Sep 14: Adventure 1 — The Behaviourist’s Prison. The party is trapped in a world built by a radical behaviourist who insists that mental states are nothing but dispositions to behave. Love is just the disposition to act in certain ways toward a person. The party must escape by showing that something about love cannot be captured behaviourally. The DM draws from Bayne Ch. 2–3 (pp. 24–54) and Brogaard Ch. 2–4. The Prinz précis from Week 2 is available as a reference.
Wed Sep 16: Debrief. Which physicalist account of love best survived the adventure? What would an eliminativist say about everything the party described?
Prompt: Using Bayne’s taxonomy of physicalist positions (behaviourism pp. 38–41, identity theory pp. 41–44, functionalism pp. 44–47, eliminativism pp. 47–52), evaluate Brogaard’s account of romantic love. Which position does her account most closely resemble? What are the main objections to that position, and how might Brogaard reply? 4–5 pages.
9 Unit 2: The Intentional Mind
Bayne coverage: Ch. 4 (pp. 56–75), Ch. 5 (pp. 77–96), Ch. 6 (pp. 98–115), Ch. 7 (pp. 117–130)
Standard problems: What is it for a mental state to be about something? Can the intentionality of love be naturalised? Does love extend beyond the skull?
9.1 Week 5 — Perception and Emotional Perception
Mon Sep 21 / Wed Sep 23
Mon Sep 21:
- Bayne, Ch. 4: “Perception” (pp. 56–75)
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 1: “Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature” (pp. 3–53)
Wed Sep 23:
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 2: “The Discernment of Perception” (pp. 54–105)
Bayne Ch. 4 (pp. 62–69) discusses intentionalism about perception and the admissible contents of perception (pp. 69–71). Nussbaum argues that emotional perception has rich content: love perceives the value of the beloved. Ask whether Nussbaum’s account requires that rich perceptual content is possible, and what Bayne’s discussion of unconscious perception (pp. 71–73) implies for love that operates below awareness.
Bayne (pp. 62–71) distinguishes thin and rich perceptual content. Nussbaum argues emotional perception has rich content — it perceives value. Does Bayne’s account of perception (pp. 56–75) make room for this claim, or does it count against it?
9.2 Week 6 — Thought, Literature, and the Chinese Room
Mon Sep 28 / Wed Sep 30
Mon Sep 28:
- Bayne, Ch. 5: “Thought” (pp. 77–96)
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 3: “Plato on Commensurability and Desire” (pp. 106–124)
Wed Sep 30:
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 4: “Flawed Crystals” (pp. 125–147)
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 5: “‘Finely Aware and Richly Responsible’” (pp. 148–167)
Bayne Ch. 5 (pp. 88–94) discusses Searle’s Chinese room argument: a system can manipulate symbols without understanding their meaning. Nussbaum’s claim that literature gives moral knowledge argument alone cannot is a parallel claim: understanding love requires more than processing propositions correctly. See Bayne’s discussion of the varieties of thought (pp. 78–81) and alternatives to the language of thought hypothesis (pp. 84–88).
Does Searle’s Chinese room argument (Bayne pp. 88–90) support or undermine Nussbaum’s claim that literary engagement with love gives us moral knowledge unavailable through argument alone? Explain the connection carefully.
9.3 Week 7 — Grounding Intentionality + Prinz Lecture 2
Mon Oct 5 / Wed Oct 7
Mon Oct 5:
- Bayne, Ch. 6: “Grounding Intentionality” (pp. 98–115)
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 6: “Perceptive Equilibrium” (pp. 168–194)
Wed Oct 7: Prinz Lecture 2 — The Emotional Construction of Morals. The instructor presents Prinz’s constructivist challenge to moral intentionality (Emotional Construction Introduction and Ch. 1). Précis distributed. Discussion: if moral emotions are culturally constructed, do they have genuine intentional content — or is their apparent “aboutness” an illusion?
Bayne Ch. 6 (pp. 98–115) presents three approaches to grounding intentionality: tracking (pp. 101–104), teleosemantic (pp. 104–107), and phenomenal (pp. 107–111). Nussbaum says love perceives the value of the beloved — but which grounding account supports this? After the Prinz lecture, ask whether Prinz’s constructivism is closer to the tracking approach gone deflationary, or a rejection of intentional content altogether. See the normativity of content box (p. 103) and Swampman (p. 107).
Bayne presents three approaches to grounding intentionality (pp. 101–111). Prinz says love’s intentional content is grounded in nothing more than cultural conditioning. Nussbaum says it is grounded in the actual value of the beloved. Which grounding story — tracking, teleosemantic, or phenomenal — best supports Nussbaum? Which best supports Prinz?
9.4 Week 8 — Externalism, the Extended Mind, and Love
Mon Oct 12 / Wed Oct 14
(Note: Fall Break was Thu–Fri Oct 8–9. This course meets Monday and Wednesday and is unaffected.)
Mon Oct 12:
- Bayne, Ch. 7: “Externalism and the Extended Mind” (pp. 117–130)
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 13: “Love and the Individual” (pp. 314–334)
Wed Oct 14: Stump enters. Love as requiring union and presence — a contribution to the extended mind debate.
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 5: “The Nature of Love” (pp. 91–111)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 6: “Union, Presence, and Omnipresence” (pp. 112–131)
Bayne Ch. 7 (pp. 125–129) presents vehicle externalism and the extended mind thesis: mental states can extend beyond the brain into the environment and into other agents. Stump’s account of love as requiring union and presence with the beloved is a striking instance of this idea. Ask whether her account is a version of vehicle externalism or whether it requires something stronger — not just cognitive extension but metaphysical union. See the box on the extended conscious mind (p. 126).
Bayne’s extended mind thesis (pp. 125–129) holds that mental states can extend beyond the brain. Stump argues love requires union and presence with the beloved (pp. 91–131). Is Stump’s account a version of vehicle externalism? What would she need to add or change to make it one?
9.5 Week 9 — 2nd DND Adventure: The Intentional Mind (Student-Led)
Mon Oct 19 / Wed Oct 21
Mon Oct 19: Adventure 2 — The Constructed City. The Deflationist has built a city whose every rule, bond, and expression of love is explicitly constructed — labeled, conditioned, revisable by decree. He challenges the party to identify anything in the city with genuine intentional content — anything whose “aboutness” is grounded in something beyond social conditioning. The DM draws from Bayne Ch. 6 (pp. 98–115) and the Prinz précis from Week 7. The party draws on Nussbaum LK Ch. 2 and 6 and Stump Ch. 5–6.
Wed Oct 21: Debrief. Did the party find genuine intentionality in the constructed city? The instructor connects the adventure to Bayne Ch. 6 and asks: which grounding theory best explains whatever the party found?
10 Unit 3: The Conscious Mind
Bayne coverage: Ch. 8 (pp. 133–152), Ch. 9 (pp. 154–175), Ch. 10 (pp. 178–194)
Standard problems: What is phenomenal consciousness? Is there something it is like to know a person? Can love cause behavior, and if so, how?
10.1 Week 10 — The Metaphysics of Consciousness and Franciscan Knowledge
Mon Oct 26 / Wed Oct 28
Mon Oct 26:
- Bayne, Ch. 8: “The Metaphysics of Consciousness” (pp. 133–152)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 1: “Suffering, Theodicy, and Defense” (pp. 3–24)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 2: “Philosophy and Narrative” (pp. 25–44)
Wed Oct 28: Stump’s Franciscan knowledge as a contribution to the consciousness debate. Is there something it is like to know a person?
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 3: “Narrative as a Means of Knowledge: Francis and Dominic” (pp. 45–70)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 4: “Narrative and the Knowledge of Persons” (pp. 71–90)
Bayne Ch. 8 (pp. 134–138) presents the knowledge argument: Mary the colour scientist knows all the physical facts about red but learns something new when she first sees red — evidence that phenomenal consciousness is not captured by physical facts. See the box on mind the gaps (p. 136). Stump’s Franciscan knowledge is a parallel argument about persons: you can know all the third-personal facts about someone and still not know them (pp. 45–90). Ask whether Stump’s argument has the same structure as the knowledge argument — and whether physicalist responses to Mary’s room (Bayne pp. 138–146) also defeat Stump.
Bayne presents the knowledge argument (pp. 134–138) as evidence that phenomenal consciousness cannot be captured by physical facts. Stump argues that knowledge of persons cannot be captured by propositional facts (pp. 45–90). Do these arguments have the same structure? If so, does a physicalist response to Mary’s room also defeat Stump?
10.2 Week 11 — Theories of Consciousness and Unconscious Love
Mon Nov 2 / Wed Nov 4
Mon Nov 2:
- Bayne, Ch. 9: “Theories of Consciousness” (pp. 154–175)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 7: “Willed Loneliness” (pp. 132–154)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 8: “Other-worldly Redemption” (pp. 155–175)
Wed Nov 4: Attachment theory and unconscious love.
- Brogaard, Ch. 5: “Relationships and Insecure Attachment” (pp. 117–152)
- Brogaard, Ch. 6: “Our Unconscious Affections” (pp. 153–178)
Bayne Ch. 9 (pp. 163–167) discusses monitoring theories of consciousness, which hold that a mental state is conscious when it is the object of a higher-order representation. Brogaard’s account of unconscious love (pp. 153–178) raises a direct puzzle: if love can operate without a higher-order representation, is it still a mental state in the relevant sense? See also Bayne’s discussion of first-person versus third-person methods (pp. 155–160) for what it would mean to study unconscious love empirically.
Bayne discusses monitoring theories of consciousness (pp. 163–167). Brogaard argues love can be unconscious (pp. 153–178). Is unconscious love still love in the philosophically relevant sense? Which theory of consciousness from Bayne Ch. 9 best handles this case?
10.3 Week 12 — Mental Causation + Prinz Lecture 3
Mon Nov 9 only (Veterans Day — no Wednesday class)
Mon Nov 9: Prinz Lecture 3 — Is Morality a Mere Emotion? The instructor presents Prinz Emotional Construction Ch. 8. Précis distributed. Combined session covering both the Bayne anchor reading and the Prinz lecture.
- Bayne, Ch. 10: “Mental Causation” (pp. 178–194) — read before class
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 11: “Love’s Knowledge” (pp. 261–285) — read before class
Discussion: the causal exclusion problem asks whether mental content can do independent causal work. If love’s content is culturally constructed with no causal power beyond its neural substrate, does Nussbaum’s claim that love gives us moral knowledge collapse?
Bayne Ch. 10 (pp. 180–184) presents the causal exclusion problem: if every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, there is no room for mental properties to do independent causal work. See also non-reductive physicalism (pp. 184–187) and Libet’s challenge (pp. 190–193). This is a deep problem for Nussbaum: if love perceives value, the perception of value must cause behavior, not just the underlying neural state. After the Prinz lecture, ask whether Prinz’s deflationism avoids the exclusion problem by denying that love has any content beyond its physical substrate — and whether that is a cost or a benefit.
Bayne’s causal exclusion problem (pp. 180–184) asks whether mental content can do independent causal work. Nussbaum says love’s perception of value causes action. Prinz says only the somatic state causes action — the content is epiphenomenal. Which view better handles Bayne’s exclusion problem?
Prompt: The causal exclusion problem (Bayne Ch. 10, pp. 178–194) asks whether mental content can do independent causal work. Evaluate Brogaard’s perceived-response theory and Nussbaum’s emotional perceptualism in light of this problem. Does either account successfully show that love’s intentional content causally explains behavior? 8–10 pages. Use the four-category rubric.
11 Unit 4: The Social Mind
Bayne coverage: Ch. 11 (pp. 196–216), Ch. 12 (pp. 218–233), Ch. 13 (pp. 234–252), Conclusion (pp. 255–257)
Standard problems: How do we know other minds? Can we trust introspection? What is the self that loves and suffers? Does the mind-body problem have a solution?
11.1 Week 13 — Other Minds and Second-Personal Knowledge
Mon Nov 16 / Wed Nov 18
Mon Nov 16:
- Bayne, Ch. 11: “Other Minds” (pp. 196–216)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 9: “The Story of Job” (pp. 179–225)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 10: “The Story of Samson” (pp. 226–262)
Wed Nov 18:
- Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, Ch. 12: “Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love” (pp. 286–313)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 11: “The Story of Abraham” (pp. 263–309)
Bayne Ch. 11 (pp. 197–214) presents the problem of other minds and three responses: argument from analogy, simulation theory, and theory theory. See especially the conceptual problem (pp. 201–203), the sceptical problem (pp. 203–208), and the beetle in the box box (p. 202). Stump’s account of second-personal knowledge is in effect a claim that love gives us a form of access to other minds that goes beyond behavioral evidence alone. Ask: is Stump offering a fourth solution to the other minds problem, or dissolving it by denying that it applies to genuine second-personal encounters?
Bayne presents three responses to the other minds problem (pp. 197–214). Does Stump’s account of second-personal knowledge offer a fourth — or does it dissolve the problem rather than solve it? What is the difference between solving and dissolving a philosophical problem?
11.2 Week 14 — The Self and the Desires of the Heart
Mon Nov 23 only (Thanksgiving Break — no Wednesday class)
Mon Nov 23: Combined session covering self-knowledge, personal identity, and Stump’s account of the desires of the heart. Reading load is heavier than usual to compensate for the lost Wednesday.
- Bayne, Ch. 12: “Self-Knowledge” (pp. 218–233) — read before class
- Bayne, Ch. 13: “The Self” (pp. 234–252) — read before class
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 12: “The Story of Mary of Bethany” (pp. 310–360)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 13: “Theodicy in Another World” (pp. 361–393)
Discussion question: Bayne’s psychological approach to personal identity (pp. 243–247) holds that the self is constituted by psychological continuity. Stump argues the self is constituted by its deepest cares — the desires of the heart. Are these compatible? Can a naturalistic account of the self accommodate what Stump means by the desires of the heart?
Bayne Ch. 12 (pp. 221–231) discusses the reliability of introspection — the inner-sense account, the inferentialist account, and neo-Rylean approaches. Bayne Ch. 13 (pp. 234–252) presents dualism, animalism, the psychological approach, and the self as illusion. Stump’s account of the desires of the heart (pp. 394–430, assigned next week) engages both: it claims the self is constituted by what it genuinely cares about, and that this is not always transparent to introspection. See the box on losing oneself (p. 237) and who wants to live forever (p. 247).
Bayne argues introspection can be unreliable (pp. 218–233). Brogaard argues love can be unconscious. Stump argues what we really care about may not be fully transparent to us. Do these three claims reinforce each other? What follows for the philosophy of love if they do?
11.3 Week 15 — 3rd DND Adventure + Final Confrontation (Student-Led)
Mon Nov 30 / Wed Dec 2
Mon Nov 30: Adventure 3 — The Deflationist’s Last Dungeon. The party has suffered an irreplaceable loss. The Deflationist offers to remove the grief through therapeutic reconstruction — and on his terms, he is being genuinely helpful. The party must decide: should they accept his offer? To refuse, they must articulate what would be lost — what the grief knows, what it honors, what aspect of the self it constitutes — that reconstruction would erase. The DM plays The Deflationist using the full character sheet (all four claims). The party draws on everything from the course, especially: Brogaard Ch. 8 (pp. 211–246), Stump Ch. 9–13 (pp. 179–393), Nussbaum LK Ch. 11–12 (pp. 261–313), Fragility passage (Canvas), and Bayne Ch. 8 and 13 (pp. 133–152, 234–252).
Readings to complete before class:
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 14: “What We Care About” (pp. 394–430)
- Stump, Wandering in Darkness, Ch. 15: “The Defense of the Defense” (pp. 431–465)
- Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, selected passage (Canvas)
- Brogaard, Ch. 7: “He Is Just Not That into You” (pp. 179–210)
- Brogaard, Ch. 8: “How to Fall Out of Love” (pp. 211–246)
- Bayne, Conclusion: “The Mind-Body Problem” (pp. 255–257)
Wed Dec 2: Prinz Lecture 4 — The Mind-Body Problem. (Last day of class) The instructor connects the final adventure to Bayne’s Conclusion (pp. 255–257). Précis distributed. Has the course resolved the mind-body problem — or has it shown that the problem of love is the mind-body problem in its most personal and philosophically urgent form?
Course synthesis: the instructor works through Bayne’s full chapter list and asks for each: what has our investigation of love added to the standard account?
Bayne’s Conclusion (pp. 255–257) returns to the mind-body problem as the organizing question of the discipline. The Deflationist’s offer in Monday’s adventure is a version of this problem made personal: if the mind is fully physical, grief is a malfunction to be repaired. Whether the party accepts or refuses the offer is effectively a vote on the mind-body problem. As you debrief on Wednesday, ask: has working through love, suffering, and the self over fifteen weeks given you a better grip on what is at stake in the mind-body problem than you would have gotten from working through it abstractly?
After four encounters with The Deflationist — and having worked through all fifteen weeks of Bayne alongside Brogaard, Nussbaum, and Stump — return to the question from Week 1: is love a gut reaction, a perception of value, or something more? Has your answer changed? What changed it?
Reflective Analysis 2: Select three of Bayne’s thirteen chapter topics. For each, write a substantial section (approximately 2–3 pages each) explaining how the primary texts in this course — Brogaard, Nussbaum, and Stump — advance, complicate, or challenge Bayne’s account of that topic. Your analysis should show both mastery of Bayne’s standard treatment and genuine philosophical engagement with the primary texts. Total length: 8–10 pages. Use the four-category rubric.
Essay 2: Write a 4–5 page essay responding to the following: Should the party have accepted The Deflationist’s offer in Adventure 3 — therapeutic reconstruction of grief? Defend your answer with reference to at least two primary texts and at least one concept from Bayne.
12 Appendix A: Bayne Chapter Assignments with Page Ranges
| Week | Date | Bayne Chapter | Pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Mon Aug 24 | Introduction: A Map of the Mind | pp. 1–5 |
| 1 | Mon Aug 24 | Ch. 1: Marks of the Mental | pp. 6–22 |
| 2 | Mon Aug 31 | Ch. 2: Physicalism | pp. 24–36 |
| 2 | Wed Sep 2 | Ch. 3: How to be a Physicalist | pp. 37–54 |
| 5 | Mon Sep 21 | Ch. 4: Perception | pp. 56–75 |
| 6 | Mon Sep 28 | Ch. 5: Thought | pp. 77–96 |
| 7 | Mon Oct 5 | Ch. 6: Grounding Intentionality | pp. 98–115 |
| 8 | Mon Oct 12 | Ch. 7: Externalism and the Extended Mind | pp. 117–130 |
| 10 | Mon Oct 26 | Ch. 8: The Metaphysics of Consciousness | pp. 133–152 |
| 11 | Mon Nov 2 | Ch. 9: Theories of Consciousness | pp. 154–175 |
| 12 | Mon Nov 9 | Ch. 10: Mental Causation | pp. 178–194 |
| 13 | Mon Nov 16 | Ch. 11: Other Minds | pp. 196–216 |
| 14 | Mon Nov 23 | Ch. 12: Self-Knowledge | pp. 218–233 |
| 14 | Mon Nov 23 | Ch. 13: The Self | pp. 234–252 |
| 15 | Wed Dec 2 | Conclusion: The Mind-Body Problem | pp. 255–257 |
13 Appendix B: Prinz Lecture Sessions
| Week | Date | Prinz Source | Bayne Connection |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | Wed Sep 2 | Gut Reactions Ch. 3–4 | Ch. 2–3: Physicalism (pp. 24–54) |
| 7 | Wed Oct 7 | Emotional Construction Intro + Ch. 1 | Ch. 6: Grounding Intentionality (pp. 98–115) |
| 12 | Mon Nov 9 | Emotional Construction Ch. 8 | Ch. 10: Mental Causation (pp. 178–194) |
| 15 | Wed Dec 2 | Full character sheet | Conclusion: Mind-Body Problem (pp. 255–257) |
14 Appendix C: Primary Text Reading Schedule with Page Ranges
14.1 Brogaard, On Romantic Love
- Ch. 1: “Letter from a Friend” (pp. 1–12) — Week 1, Mon Aug 24
- Ch. 2: “The Chemistry of Love” (pp. 13–58) — Weeks 1–2
- Ch. 4: “Irrational Love” (pp. 59–116) — Week 3, Wed Sep 9
- Ch. 5: “Relationships and Insecure Attachment” (pp. 117–152) — Week 11, Wed Nov 4
- Ch. 6: “Our Unconscious Affections” (pp. 153–178) — Week 11, Wed Nov 4
- Ch. 7: “He Is Just Not That into You” (pp. 179–210) — Week 15, Mon Nov 30
- Ch. 8: “How to Fall Out of Love” (pp. 211–246) — Week 15, Mon Nov 30
14.2 Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge
- Ch. 1: Introduction (pp. 3–53) — Week 5, Mon Sep 21
- Ch. 2: The Discernment of Perception (pp. 54–105) — Week 5, Wed Sep 23
- Ch. 3: Plato on Commensurability and Desire (pp. 106–124) — Week 6, Mon Sep 28
- Ch. 4: Flawed Crystals (pp. 125–147) — Week 6, Wed Sep 30
- Ch. 5: Finely Aware and Richly Responsible (pp. 148–167) — Week 6, Wed Sep 30
- Ch. 6: Perceptive Equilibrium (pp. 168–194) — Week 7, Mon Oct 5
- Ch. 11: Love’s Knowledge (pp. 261–285) — Week 12, Mon Nov 9
- Ch. 12: Narrative Emotions (pp. 286–313) — Week 13, Wed Nov 18
- Ch. 13: Love and the Individual (pp. 314–334) — Week 8, Mon Oct 12
- Ch. 15: Transcending Humanity (pp. 365–391) — Week 15, Mon Nov 30
14.3 Stump, Wandering in Darkness
- Ch. 1: Suffering, Theodicy, and Defense (pp. 3–24) — Week 10, Mon Oct 26
- Ch. 2: Philosophy and Narrative (pp. 25–44) — Week 10, Mon Oct 26
- Ch. 3: Narrative as a Means of Knowledge (pp. 45–70) — Week 10, Wed Oct 28
- Ch. 4: Narrative and the Knowledge of Persons (pp. 71–90) — Week 10, Wed Oct 28
- Ch. 5: The Nature of Love (pp. 91–111) — Week 8, Wed Oct 14
- Ch. 6: Union, Presence, and Omnipresence (pp. 112–131) — Week 8, Wed Oct 14
- Ch. 7: Willed Loneliness (pp. 132–154) — Week 11, Mon Nov 2
- Ch. 8: Other-worldly Redemption (pp. 155–175) — Week 11, Mon Nov 2
- Ch. 9: The Story of Job (pp. 179–225) — Week 13, Mon Nov 16
- Ch. 10: The Story of Samson (pp. 226–262) — Week 13, Mon Nov 16
- Ch. 11: The Story of Abraham (pp. 263–309) — Week 13, Wed Nov 18
- Ch. 12: The Story of Mary of Bethany (pp. 310–360) — Week 14, Mon Nov 23
- Ch. 13: Theodicy in Another World (pp. 361–393) — Week 14, Mon Nov 23
- Ch. 14: What We Care About (pp. 394–430) — Week 15, Mon Nov 30
- Ch. 15: The Defense of the Defense (pp. 431–465) — Week 15, Mon Nov 30
14.4 Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness (Canvas excerpt)
- Selected passage on love and vulnerability — Week 15, Mon Nov 30
14.5 Session Prep: Monday
Opening move: [Describe how you plan to open the session.]
Key tension to surface: [What is the central philosophical tension for this session?]
Likely sticking point: [What do students usually find difficult? How will you address it?]
Time allocation (75 min):
- 10 min: [Activity]
- 20 min: [Activity]
- 20 min: [Discussion]
- 15 min: [Activity]
- 10 min: [Wrap-up and preview]
14.5.1 Discussion Questions — Monday
[Discussion question 1]
[Discussion question 2]
[Discussion question 3]
14.6 Session Prep: Wednesday
Goal for this session: [What should students leave understanding?]
The key move: [What is the central argument or idea to develop?]
Time allocation (75 min):
- 5 min: Recap Monday
- 25 min: [Activity]
- 20 min: Discussion
- 15 min: [Activity]
- 10 min: Assign next week’s readings
Weekly Reflection prompt (write on board): “[Weekly reflection prompt for this week]”
14.6.1 Discussion Questions — Wednesday
[Discussion question 1]
[Discussion question 2]
[Discussion question 3]
[Weekly reflection prompt goes here.]
14.7 DND Notes — Week 03
[DND session prep notes if applicable. Otherwise delete this section.]